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STATE OF UTAH

March 28, 1990

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

State of Utah v. Parrel E. Brady

Dear Mr. Butler:
Respondent, the State of Utah, has filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition in the above-referenced case based on
defendant's untimely filing of the Petition for Certiorari.
Contemporaneously, defendant has filed a Request for Extension of
Time to file his petition.
Should the Court allow defendant an extension of time
to file the petition, respondent would waive the right to file a
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari pursuant
to Rule 47(d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. This waiver does
not constitute a stipulation that the petition should be granted,
but rather, it is respondent's position that the petition should
be denied based upon the legal analysis contained in the brief of
respondent, the supplement brief of respondent and the opinion of
the Utah Court of Appeals which are attached to this letter. In
the event that the Court deems an additional response by the
State necessary to its determination, a Barief in Opposition will
be provided.
Thank you for your consideration*
Very truly

O/^
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
— -

H

—

—
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cc:

Darrel E. Brady, pro se
MAR 't V WW

Enclosure
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

DARREL E. BRADY,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Casfe No. 880278-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
1

This appeal is from the denial df a motion to withdraw
a plea of guilty in the Third Judicial District Court. This
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTEE) ON APPEAL
The following issue is presented} in this appeal:
Did the trial court properly deity defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes and rul^s for a determination
of this case are, in pertinent part:
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (Supp. 1989). Withdrawal of Pleai
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and
with leave of court.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978).
Determination t

Habitual Criminal-

Any person who has been twice convicted,
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses
at least one of which offenses having been at
least a felony of the 6econd degree or a
crime which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of second degree,
and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second
degree committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1002 (1978).
Punishmentt

Habitual Criminal-Procedure

(1) In charging a person with being a
habitual criminal, the information or
complaint filed before the committing
magistrate shall allege the felony committed
within the state of Utah and the two or more
felony convictions relied upon by the state
of Utah.
(2) If the defendant is bound over to the
district court for trial, the county attorney
shall in the information or complaint set
forth the felony committed within the state
of Utah and the two or more previous felony
convictions relied upon for the charge of
being a habitual c r i m i n a l . . . .
Utah Code Ann. £ 77-13-1 (Supp. 1989).

Kinds of Pleasx

There are five kinds of pleas in an
indictment or information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Not guilty;
Guilty;
No contest;
Not guilty by reason of insanity;
and
(5) Guilty and mentally ill.

An alternative plea of not guilty or not
guilty by reason of insanity may be entered.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-32*1 (Supp. 1989). Minimum Standards
Provided by County for Defense of Indigent Defendants!
The following are minimum standards to be
provided by each county, city, and town for
the defense of indigent persons in criminal
cases in the courts and various
administrative bodies of the state:

(5) Include the taking of a first
appeal of right and the prosecuting of other
remedies before or after a conviction,
considered by the defending counsel to be in
the interest of justice except for other and
subsequent discretionary appeals or
discretionary writ proceedings.
I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I
Defendant was charged by amended information with
escape, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-8-309 (1978); aggravated arson, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (1978) ; and being a
habitual criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001
(1978); (R. 92-93).

On April 23, 1985, defendant, through a plea

bargain arrangement, entered an "Alford" guilty plea to a lesser
charge of attempted aggravated arson, a third degree felony.

The

remaining charges of escape and being a habitual criminal were
dismissed (R. 138). The Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, Third
Judicial District, sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison to run
consecutively with defendant's then present sentences (R. 139).

The aggravated arson statute was amended in 1986 to make it a
first degree offense. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (Supp. 1989).
Defendant's conviction was in 1985 and therefore a second degree
felony.
^

On November 10, 1987, defendant filed a motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty to attempted aggravated arson (R.
146-63; R. 164-79).

An evidentiary hearing was conducted on

January 8, 1988 before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, Third
Judicial District Court (R. 202, 225). The matter was taken
under advisement (R. 202). On March 28, 1988, defendant's motion
to withdraw his plea of guilty was formally denied (R. 211).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was convicted on March 25, 1981 by jury trial
of aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping and theft of a motor
vehicle (R. 147). He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for
the indeterminate term of five years to life (R. 15, 147). On
August 21, 1984, while still an inmate, defendant escaped from
the Medium Security Facility of the Utah State Prison.

He was

apprehended outside the prison the same day (Brief of App.,
Statement of Facts).

The morning of the escape, a fire was

started in the Industrial Building of the Utah State Prison (R.
93; Brief of App., Statement of Facts).

The State contended that

the fire was started as a diversion to aid defendant's escape (R.
51).
On August 22, 1984, defendant was charged with escape
in the Third Judicial District Court, Case No. CR 84-1104 (R. 3).
The case was assigned to Judge Jay E. Banks and trial set for
January 31, 1985 (R. 24). Mr. Glenn Iwasaki, Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association, was appointed to represent defendant (R.
4).

Several weeks after defendant was arrested on the
escape, the State's arson investigation was completed (R. 52).
Defendant was then charged with aggravated arson and being a
habitual criminal, Third Judicial District Court Case No. CR-841346.

Mr. Iwasaki was also appointed to rfepresent defendant in
2
the arson case (T. 6-7).
During his representation of defendant, Mr. Iwasaki
undertook plea bargain negotiations with the county attorney (T.
16).

In a letter dated January 14, 1985, Mr. Iwasaki informed

defendant of a proposed plea bargain (T. 16-17; Exhibit A).

Mr.

Iwasaki's intention was to have defendant plead to a third degree
felony, reduced from a second degree felony.

In exchange, the

other charges of escape and being a habitual criminal would be
dismissed (T. 18).
After defendant received Mr. Iwasaki's letter,
defendant informed counsel he wished to proceed pro se (T. 17).
A motion was submitted to the trial court (T. 17; R. 26-27).
After hearing, defendant was allowed to proceed pro se with Mr.
Iwasaki assisting (T. 4, 11, 17; R. 31).
In preparation for trial, defendant successfully moved
pro se for the appointment of a fingerprint expert, an
investigator, an arson expert, and a psychiatrist (T. 11-12; R.
57-61, 77, 81, 83). At defendant's request, a transcript of the

Transcripts of the hearings on the Motion to Withdraw dated
December 11, 1987 and January 8, 1988 are included in a single
supplemental index (R. 225). The pages have not been paginated
on appeal. To avoid confusion, reference will be made to the
substantive hearing on January 8 as (T. ) and to the December
11th hearing as (T~ ).

preliminary hearing on defendant's arson charge was prepared (R.
78).

Additionally, "quite a few" subpoenas were served to secure

defense witnesses (T. 13); in his brief, defendant claims fiftyeight (58) subpoenas.

Defendant also received a suit and shoes

from his family for trial (T. 12).
On April 23, 1985, the morning of the trial, the county
attorney approached both defendant and Mr. Iwasaki "to consider
the possibility of pleading to a third degree [felony]."
13).

(T.

Subsequently, a pre-trial meeting was held in chambers (T.

13, 22). Defcmdant in his pro se capacity represented that he
would not plead to "anything arson related," but would plead to
"anything escape related" (T. 15-16).
During the discussion which ensued, the possibility of
an "Alford" plea was discussed.

Both Mr. Iwasaki and Judge Banks

explained to defendant that an "Alford" plea was not an admission
of guilt, but could be entered to avoid higher penalties (T. 20).
Defendant agreed to enter an "Alford" plea to a third degree
3
felony in exchange for the other charges being dismissed.
Directly after the fifteen (15) to thirty (30) minute
meeting, defendant entered an "Alford" plea to the reduced charge
of attempted aggravated arson (R. 22, 136-38).

All remaining

charges were dismissed (R. 138). Defendant waived time for
sentencing and was immediately sentenced to the statutory term of
one to five years (R. 139).

The initial negotiations involved a plea to arson; however, the
plea was entered to attempted aggravated arson. Both charges are
third degree felonies. Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-102, 103 and 76-4nn<> iiQ-iow
Mr TwARaki. who was advising defendant, stated his

No direct appeal of defendant's conviction was taken.
Some two and one-half years later, on November 10,
1987# defendant, pro se, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea claiming that Judge Banks had improperly participated in
plea negotiations, coercing defendant into entering a plea (R.
146-63).
3-28).

An evidentiary hearing was held ^>n January 8, 1988 (T.
On February 29, 1988, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge,

Third District Court, denied defendant's motion finding that:
Defendant has failed to show good cause as to
why his plea should be set aside. The terms
of the plea negotiation were discussed and
outlined in correspondence between the
prosecutor and defense counsel before the
parties appeared in court for entry of the
plea. Judge Banks made a finding that the
plea was voluntarily made and defendant has
failed to produce evidence to support his
claim that the plea was coerced and therefore
a nullity, or for any other reason that the
plea should be set aside.
(R. 203).
On April 28, 1988, defendant appealed from the denial
of his motion to withdraw his plea (R. 216-24).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTf
Because the defendant has failed to include the
transcript of his plea as part of the recbrd on appeal, this
Court should limit its review to whether the trial court abused
its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea
and presume that defendant's plea fully complied with Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

[

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in that
there was no evidence to establish defendant's plea was coerced

or otherwise entered improperly.

Defendant's conviction should,

therefore, be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME DEFENDANT'S PLEA
WAS PROPERLY ENTERED AND LIMIT ITS REVIEW TO
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11, (Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11 (1978),
amended 1989), sets forth the procedure a court must follow
before accepting a guilty plea.

It provides:

(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty or no contest and shall not accept
such a plea until the court has made the
findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2)

That the plea is voluntarily

made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial and to
confront and cross-examine in open court
the witnesses against him, and that by
entering the plea he waives all of those
rights;
(4) That the defendant understands
the nature and elements of the offense to
which he is entering the plea; that upon
trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the
plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the
minimum and maximum sentence that may be
imposed upon him for each offense to which
a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of

(6) Whether the tendered plea is a
result of a prior pleas discussion and
pleas agreement and if so, what agreement
has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a
plea to a lesser included offense, or the
dismissal of other charges, the same shall
be approved by the court. . . .
Although defendant makes a wide variety of claims, the thrust of
his assertion is that his plea was coerced, and therefore
4
involuntarily entered in violation of Rule 11(e)(2).
While trial courts carry the burden of ensuring that
guilty pleas are entered in compliance wit^i Rule 11(e), State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), and State v.
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied,
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); withdrawing a guilty plea is a
privilege, and not a right.
1041 (Utah 1987).

State v. Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040,

The rationale which allows a guilty plea to be

withdrawn is to protect against a plea which is entered
unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily.

Iji.

To

accomplish this, w[t]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against
him,w State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313, quoting McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), superseded by rule, 857
F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988).

As a general rule, judges may not

Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 11 was amended in 1989 and redesignated.
To avoid any confusion with the record, respondent will refer to
the pre-1989 rule structure as found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11
(1978).

rely solely on defense counsel or affidavits, even if properly
executed, to ensure a defendant's understanding of his rights.
Id.
How€?ver, when an appellant fails to provide an adequate
record on appeal, a reviewing court must assume regularity in the
proceedings below.

Jolivet v. Cook, No. 880341, slip op. at 5

(Utah S. Ct. Aug. 22, 1989); State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599 (Utah
1988).

The burden of showing error is on appellant.

State v.

Marcum, 750 P.2d at 603.
When a defendant predicates error to this
Court, he has the duty and responsibility of
supporting such allegation by an adequate
record. Absent that record, defendant's
assignment of error stands as a unilateral
allegation which the review court has no
power to determine. This Court simply cannot
rule on a question which depends for its
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by
the record.
State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988), quoting State
v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460
U.S. 1044 (1983).
In the case at bar, defendant has not provided any
transcript of his plea on April 23, 1985.

Consequently, this

Court should presume that the guilty plea was entered in full
compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 and limit appellate review to
consideration of whether the lower court abused its discretion in
denying defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw the plea.

Such

an approach is particularly appropriate where any review of
defendant's plea would be under the Htotality of the record"
standard of Warner v, Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985)Hickman, No. 880362 (Utah S. Ct. August 17, 1989).

State v.

Here, in view

of defendant's written affidavit in support of his plea (R. 13637) and his advisory counsel's testimony that the plea was
voluntary (T. 20-22), the "record as a whole" would reflect a
validly entered plea.

Id.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY.
On appeal, defendant claims his guilty plea was coerced
and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw
his plea.

Sines Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (Supp. 1989) allows "a

plea of guilty , . . [to] be withdrawn only upon good cause shown
and with leave of court/' a reviewing court will reverse the
trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea "only when it
clearly appears the trial court has abused its discretion" in
determining that no good cause existed.

State v. Vasilacopulos/

756 P.2d at 93f citing State v. Mildenhal^, 747 P.2d 422, 424
(Utah 1987).

S$e also State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 895 (Utah

1988).
A.

There Is No Evidence that Defendant's
Plea Was Coerced.

The h^art of defendant's contention is that the trial
court improperly initiated plea bargain d iscussions on the
morning of trial, in violation of Utah R. Ckrim. P. 11(f) (1978).
Further, defendant alleges Judge Banks stated that if defendant
did not accept the proposed plea bargain and was convicted on the
pending charges, defendant would never get out of prison.
record does not substantiate either claims

The

Defendant claims "the court, on its own, had
[defendant] brought from [a] holding room, along with his stand
by attorney, Mr. Glen Iwasaki, to court chambers . . • and
proceeded to intimidate and coerce appellant to plead guilty."
(Br. App. 5). The evidence from the evidentiary hearing
established instead that the prosecutor approached defendant,
proceeding pro se,

to extend the plea bargain offer prior to any

pre-trial meeting in chambers.
Q:

[Defendant pro se]; Coming to the
morning of trial, did you on that morning
at any time — was there anybody that
approached you concerning any plea
negotiations?

A:

[Mr. Glenn Iwasaki]:
trial?

Q:

Yes.

A:

I believe that there was some discussion
at that time of whether or not we could
resolve the issues of this case to plead
to a third degree arson.

Q:

Was this between you and I or some other
party?

A:

It would have to be instituted by the
county attorney's office. And I believe
it was Mr. D'Elia at the time who
approached, I believe both of us, because
you were acting as your own attorney, to
consider the possibility of pleading to a
third degree.

Q:

Is it also correct while we was in that
holding room, the bailiff came or someone
from the court and told us to enter judge
Bank's chambers?

A:

I recall being in Judge Bank's chambers.
How we got there is foggy.

Q:

Do you recall who all was present?

On the morning of

A:

I believe you and I, Mr. D'Elia and Judge
Banks. I believe the bailiff was in
there. I don't recall if a reporter was
in there or not.

Q:

Do you remember what was said or even
part of what was said during hearing in
the room in Judge's chambers, Mr.
Iwasaki?

A:

Not verbatim. I can generalize about may
recollection of the conversation.

Q:

Please do.

A:

My recollection was that you were
prepared to go to trial. You had jury
instructions prepared, witnesses
subpoenaed and that there wa^ an offer at
that time for you to plead to a lessor
charge.

Q:

Who made the offer?

A:

My recollection was Mr. D'El|a.

(T. 12-14).
Utah R. Crim P. 11(f) provides in pertinent part:
The judge shall not participate |n plea
discussions prior to any agreement being made
by the prosecuting attorney, but once a
tentative plea agreement has been reached
which contemplates entry of a plea in the
expectation that other charges will be
dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request
of the parties, may permit the disclosure to
him of such tentative agreement and the
reasons therefor in advance of the time for
tender of the plea. The judge may then
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether he will approve the
proposed disposition. . . .
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not encouraged a trial
court's participation in plea negotiations, such involvement has
not automatically voided an otherwise voluntary and lawfully

entered guilty plea.

State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Utah

1986).
Here, the county attorney made the plea proposal to
defendant and his counsel outside chambers.

The parties then

appeared in-chambers to discuss pre-trial matters.
presence was required because he was acting pro se.

Defendant's
Apparently,

the trial court, at that point, was informed of the plea
proposal.

This was not a case where the court could initially

confer with counsel privately; defendant was counsel.
Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301 n.7.

State v.

Further, there is nothing in the

record to indicate that either defendant pro se, his advisory
counsel or the county attorney objected to the in-chambers
conference.
The record is clear that there were no threats or
intimation of dire consequences (T. 23). There was no mention of
increased penalties or otherwise being punished for the exercise
of the right to go to trial (T. 23). Contrary to defendant's
assertion, he was not told that if he declined the plea bargain
and was convicted, he would never get out of prison (T. 25).
Instead, the record reveals that after the bargain was offered by
the county attorney, a discussion ensued after which defendant,
acting pro se but with the concurrence of advisory counsel, chose
to accept the plea bargain (T. 15, 21). There is no evidence
from which to conclude that the plea was not voluntarily entered.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying
The only information in the record as to what occurred inchambers is Mr. Iwasaki's testimony during the motion to withdraw
(T. 3-25).

defendant's motion to withdraw his plea,

^olivet v. Cook, No.

880341, slip op. at 4.
Defendant also asserts the information contained a
second or extra count of being a habitual criminal which had a
coercive effect on defendant accepting the plea bargain.
Defendant's allegation seems to stem from a misreading of the
record.
Defendant was initially charged with escape from
official custody, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-8-309 (1978).

A preliminary hearing was conducted

and defendant was bound over for trial (R. 4). Based on
subsequent investigations, the State separately charged defendant
with aggravated arson and being a habitual criminal (R. 50-52,
64-68).

The State moved to join the escape charge as Count I and

the aggravated arson charge as Count II, under Utah Code Ann.
S 77-35-9 (1982), as both charges arose out of the same criminal
episode and could have been joined in a single information (R.
53-54).

A single charge of being a habitual criminal, Count III,

was included in the amended information based on a violation of
either Count I or II and defendant's prior criminal record (R.
92-93).
Although defendant correctly asserts a defendant must
be bound over before being charged with being a habitual
criminal, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1002(2) (1978), he misconstrues
the amended information as charging two separate habitual
criminal counts. Additionally, defendant misconceives the
habitual criminal charge as a separate offense.

It is not.

The

habitual criminal statute is not a substantive offense but merely
a method of sentence enhancement once convicted.

State v.

Williams, 733 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989); State v. Stilling, 102 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 (1989).

Thus, by entering into the plea bargain,

defendant was only convicted of a third degree felony punishable
by an indeterminate term of not more than five years.

If he had

proceeded to trial and been convicted of either escape or
aggravated arson, he would have faced an enhanced sentence of
five years to life.

The advisability of the plea where defendant

had already admitted his guilt to one of the counts is obvious.
Clearly, the "coercive" discussion alleged by defendant was an
attempt by all concerned to help a pro se litigant fully
understand his alternatives and the most advantageous course.
B.

Other Asserted Defects In Defendant's Plea Are
Without Merit

Defendant makes several other allegations, unrelated to
coercion, presumably in an attempt to establish a defect in his
guilty plea which would warrant its withdrawal.

An examination

of each his claims reveals they are without merit.
Defendant challenges the legality of his "Alford" plea
because the statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 (Supp.
1989) does not specifically mention "Alford" pleas.
In the case of North Carolina v, Alford, 400 U,S. 25,
37 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held:
[W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both
a waiver of trial and an express admission of
guilt, the latter element is not a
constitutional requisite to the imposition of
criminal penalty. An individual accused of
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of

a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or
unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has held an otherwise
valid guilty plea is not rendered involuntary if it is entered to
avoid harsher penalties.

State v. Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301, Most

recently, the Court added "an accused can lawfully plead guilty
to an offense for which he could not have been convicted if the
plea is in exchange for a lessor sentence/' Hurst v. Cook, No.
860075, slip op. at 14 (Utah S. Ct. June 30, 1989) (citations
omitted).

The rule is limited to cases "where the offense

pleaded to is so related to the crime originally charged that an
examination of the accused's record would ^ot be misleading as to
the nature of the accused's criminal conduct."

Id.

In the present case, defendant's guilty plea was
entered to attempted aggravated arson, a third degree felony,
reduced from aggravated arson, a second decree felony.
Additionally, the State dismissed the charges of escape, a second
degree felony, and being a habitual criminal, which would have
enhanced either conviction to a first degree felony.

The record

is clear defendant understood the potential penalties if
convicted (R. 23) and choose to enter an "jUford" plea to avoid
the possibility of a higher penalty.
Attempted aggravated arson is of the same genre as
aggravated arson, one of the original charges filed against
defendant.

The State's theory was defendant had intentionally

set the fire to create a diversion for his escape (R. 51). Under
the facts, defendant's "conviction does not distort the nature of

his criminal conduct or create a false impression concerning that
conduct,"

Hurst, No. 860075, slip op. at 15.
As previously outlined in Point I, supra, when an

appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, a
reviewing court presumes regularity in the proceedings below.
Jolivet v. Cook, No. 880341, slip op. at 5.

In the present case,

defendant raises claims which simply cannot be properly reviewed
without a transcript of his plea.

Specifically, defendant

asserts 1) there is an inadequate factual basis to support his
plea, 2) the plea bargain improperly substituted attempted
aggravated arson in place of arson and 3) the colloquy between
judge and defendant was inadequate.

Without a transcript of the

entry of the plea, this Court should decline to reach defendant's
claims and presume defendant's plea was properly entered.
Defendant further complains that because he pled to an
"aggravated" offense, he has become adversely affected under a
new prison classification scheme.

Defendant's claim, even if

true, does not represent sufficient grounds to allow his plea to
be withdrawn.

Defendant entered his plea in April, 1985 (R. 138)

but complains he is now affected by a 1987 classification system.
(Br. of App. 13.)

Defendant does not assert that he

misunderstood his sentence, State v. Smith, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 36
(1989), or the degree of crime to which he pled, State v. West,
765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988).

Nor, does he allege any illusory

promises were made to him, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah
1988) or bargains broken, State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986).

Under these facte, a subsequent and unforseeable change

in prison classifications cannot constitute a basis justifying
the withdrawal of a valid plea.
Defendant also argues the presentation of his argument
during the motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea was a "farce"
because he was limited to two minutes.
A review of the record demonstrates defendant was given
ample opportunity to present his evidence (T. 3-28).

The matter

was then submitted on memorandum (T. 27). Defendant was not
entitled to unlimited argument.
considered by the court.

All pertinent facts were

Defendant's contention is without

merit.
Defendant's last claim is he was wrongfully denied the
appointment of counsel to bring his motion to withdraw his plea.
This claim is also without merit.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (Supp. 1989) provides:
The following are minimum standards to be
provided by each county, city, and town for
the defense of indigent person in criminal
cases in the course and various
administrative bodies of the state:

(5) Include the taking of a first
appeal of right and the prosecuting of other
remedies before or after a conviction,
considered by the defending counsel to be in
the interest of justice except for other and
subsequent discretionary appeals or
discretionary writ proceedings.
Defendant did not seek an appeal of his conviction.
The motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea was not a first
appeal of right but rather a discretionary hearing.

As such,

under the language of the statute, defendant was not entitled to
appointed counsel.

Moreover, it appears defendant's only reason in moving
for counsel was to obtain the defense file created by Mr.
Iwasaki's during his representation of defendant.
The Court: . . . .
I have a serious
question as to whether you're entitled to
appointment of counsel at this stage of the
proceeding.
Defendant [pro se]: About the only thing I
could argue myself — the only problem I
would have is aligning — I know Mr. Iwasaki
works for the county attorney now, and I'm
going to need his file, and maybe an attorney
can get it easier for me. It kind of creates
a problem there.
The Court: You mean the file he generated
when he represented you?
Defendant:

Yes.

The Court: Do you have any object to having
Mr. Iwasaki produce that?
Mr. Verhoef [deputy county attorney]: No, in
fact, Mr. Iwasaki has represented to me he
has a file available in his office.

The Court: Why don't you have him produce it
on the day of the hearing? Would that be
sufficient if I gave you some time before the
hearing to do that?
Defendant:

Yes, that would be fine.

(T2. 6-7).
Defendant made no further request for counsel.
these circumstances, there was no error in not appointing
counsel•

Under

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests the trial court's ruling denying
defendant'6 motion to withdraw his plea be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this tf£W) day of August, 1989
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^jCAA/^tfoJ^Ccrt\
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were majiled, postage prepaid,
to Darrel E. Brady, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, this a 3 £ ^
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 880278-CA

v.
DARREL E. BRADY,

Category ^Jo. 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
INTRODUCTION
After both parties submitted briefs in this matter, the
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals determined that a supplemental
transcript had been filed with the Court, such that, supplemental
briefing would be appropriate.

Therefore, Respondent's

Supplemental Brief is submitted to clarify any issues raised by
the inclusion of the supplemental transcript of the April 23,
1985, entry of guilty plea by defendant.
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF T^E CASE
In reference to the original State'$ brief, hereafter
referred to as Br. of Resp., at 3, the statement that defendant
entered an "Alford" guilty plea to a lesser charge of attempted
aggravated arson, a third degree felony, is inaccurate.

Based on

the supplemental transcript, defendant entered an "Alford" guilty
plea to a lesser charge of arson, a third degree felony (S.T. 4,
10).

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In reference to Br. of Resp. at 6, the statement in the
body of the summary and in footnote 3 that defendant entered a
plea to attempted aggravated arson, a third degree felony, is
inaccurate.

During the plea negotiations, defendant agreed to

plead to a third degree felony arson-related charge (R. 17-19).
Defendant prepared an affidavit stating his intention to enter a
plea of guilty to simple arson, as a third degree felony (R. 13637).

During the hearing for the entry of the plea, the trial

court referred interchangeably to defendant pleading guilty to
attempted aggravated arson (S.T. 3, 11) and arson (S.T. 4, 10,
11).

When the plea was formally entered, the following occurred:
THE COURT: And to the charge under the
amended information of aggravated arson, your
former plea of not guilty is set aside, and
to the charge of arson, a third degree felony
as I've explained it to you, which occurred
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or
about August 21st of 1984 in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, Utah Code
Annotated 1953f as amended, in that the
defendant, Darrell Eugene Brady, a party to
the offense, did unlawfully and intentionally
damage the structure of a building and said
value of said destruction exceeded $5,000 by
means of fire or explosives, what now is your
plea, guilty or not guilty?
MR. BRADY: Guilty, Your Honor, pursuant to
the Alford.

(S.T. 11) (emphasis added).

Thus, the trial court in the taking

of the plea referred to simple arson but referenced the
aggravated arson statute.

While there is some confusion in the

record, the majority of references, and the more explicit

ARGUMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT I
All of the State's argument in Point I of Br. of Resp.
is correct.

However, with the inclusion of the transcript of the

April 23, 1985 entry of plea, this Court need not merely presume
regularity in the proceedings below.

Rather, applying the

Warner-Brooks standard referred to, this Court may find that
defendant's plea was voluntarily entered based on the record as a
whole.
Here, the trial court personally inquired of defendant
as to his understanding and knowledge of:
1. The purpose and effect of an "Afford"
plea (S.T. 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11);
2. The voluntary nature of the plea (S.T. 56, 10).
3. The nature of the charges filed against
defendant and their possible penalties (S.T.
3-4);
4. The constitutional rights which defendant
was waiving by entering a guilty plea,
including the right against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to a jury trial, and
the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses in open court (S.T. 6-8);
5. The state's burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of all elements of the crime
charged (S.T. 6-7);
6. The nature of the charge to which he was
pleading, including its elements, anqi
possible penalties (S.T. 3-5, 10);
7. The parameters of any plea bargain (S.T.
3-5); and,
8. The fact that the court was not bound by
any sentencing recommendations in the plea
bargain (S.T. 4).

Based on the personal colloquy between the trial court and
defendant, in addition to the affidavit of defendant made in
anticipation of the entry of the plea, it is clear that the trial
court fully complied with all procedural and constitutional
requirements in the acceptance of defendant's gulty plea.
SUPPLEMENTAL POINT II
In reference to Br, of Resp. at 17, the supplemental
transcript demonstrates clearly that defendant wanted to enter a
guilty plea under "Alford" to avoid the harsher penalties of the
crimes originally charged (S.T. 3, 5, 11).
In reference to Br. of Resp. at 18, the State agrees
that the plea anticipated and the plea entered was to arson, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102
(1978).

As such, while the order denying defendant's motion to

withdraw his plea should be affirmed, the judgment and commitment
order should be corrected to reflect defendant's conviction for
arson, a third degree felony, as opposed to attempted aggravated
arson.

Because the statutory sentences are the same, no

correction of sentence is necessary.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

fc#u

clay of January,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Supplemental Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Darrel E. Brady, p_ro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, this
_/f£^day of January, 1990.
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PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of his
motion to withdraw a guilty plea to attempted aggravated arson,
claiming the trial court improperly participated in the plea
bargain agreement and his plea was not entered into voluntarily
or knowingly. We affirm.
In 1981, defendant was convicted of several crimes and
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. On August 21, 1984,
while serving that sentence, a fire was started at the prison
and shortly thereafter, defendant escaped. Defendant was
apprehended outside the prison and charged w^th escape.
Several weeks later, he was charged with aggravated arson and
with being a habitual criminal.
In January 1985, defendant's attorney informed defendant
by letter of a proposed plea bargain in whicn defendant would
plead to a third degree felony in exchange for dismissal of the
escape and habitual criminal charges. After receiving the
attorney's letter, defendant informed the attorney he wished to
proceed pro se.
On the morning of trial, the county attorney, defendant,
his attorney, and the judge held a pre-trial meeting in
chambers and discussed entering a plea. Although the record
does not contain a transcript of the in-chamlbers discussion,
the State and defendant agree that during the discussion,
defendant was informed he could enter an Alflord plea to a third
degree felony in exchange for dismissal of the escape and

habitual criminal charges.1 Immediately after the meeting
defendant, the prosecutor, his attorney and the judge entered
the courtroom and discussed the plea arrangement. The court
indicated that based upon the in-chambers discussion, defendant
wanted to withdraw his plea of not guilty to aggravated arson
and enter an Alford plea to attempted aggravated arson. The
court then discussed some of the rights defendant was waiving,
obtained defendants statement that the plea was free and
voluntary and had defendant execute an affidavit. After that
discussion, defendant's attorney stated that the plea defendant
was entering was to simple arson. The court then stated
And to the charge under the amended
information of aggravated arson, your
former plea of not guilty is set aside,
and to the charge of arson, a third degree
felony as I've explained to you, which
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on or about August 21, 1984 in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, Darrell Eugene
Brady, a party to the offense, did
unlawfully and intentionally damage the
structure of a building and said value of
said destruction exceeded $5,000 by the
means of fire or explosives, what now is
your plea, guilty or not guilty.
Defendant responded that his plea was guilty, pursuant to
Alford. The affidavit defendant signed indicated that he was
pleading guilty to the charge of arson, a third degree felony,
pursuant to Alford. The judgment, however, states that
defendant entered a plea of guilty to attempted aggravated
arson.
Two years later, defendant filed a motion to withdraw the
guilty plea. The court denied the motion, stating:
1. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the United
States Supreme Court held that "[aln individual accused of a
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling to
or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting
the crime."

Defendant has failed to show good cause as
to why his plea should be set asitfe. The
terms of the plea negotiation werfc
discussed and outlined in correspondence
between the prosecutor and defense counsel
before the parties appeared in co^irt for
entry of the plea. Judge Banks m^de a
finding that the plea was voluntarily made
and defendant has failed to produce
evidence to support his claim thap the
plea was coerced and therefore a Nullity,
or for any other reason that the £lea
should be set aside.
This appeal followed.
Defendant asserts that the trial judge improperly
participated in the plea bargain agreement a^id coerced him to
enter a plea. Generally, the trial court's participation in
plea negotiations is not to be encouraged du0 to the danger
that a trial court's participation might hav0 a coercive effect
on defendant. State y. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 ((jtah 1986).
Further, Rule 11 provides that the judge shall not participate
in plea discussions prior to any agreement hy the prosecuting
attorney and defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 771-35-11(8) (a)
(1989). However, where there is no record evidence that the
trial court participated in the agreement or that the judge's
actions coerced defendant to plead guilty, Rule 11 is not
violated. Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301. In this cpse, the only
indication that the trial judge participated in plea
negotiations is defendant's recollection that the court
explained to him that he could enter his plea pursuant to
Alford and thereby not admit the acts supporting the charge.
We therefore find that the record does not support the
contention that the judge improperly particibated in the plea
negotiations.
Defendant also contends he was improperly convicted of
attempted aggravated arson because the in-ch&mbers discussion
led him to believe he was going to enter an ftlford plea to
simple arson. In the transcript, the judge tefers to both a
plea of attempted aggravated arson and a ple^i of arson. Thus,
defendant claims, he was confused when he pl^d guilty. The
State concedes that the record from the taking of the guilty
plea is confusing and agrees that the plea anticipated and
entered was to arson. Accordingly, the Statfe requests that the
sentence be corrected to reflect defendant•s conviction for
arson. Further, because the statutory sentences are the same,
the State claims, no correction of sentence lis required.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) provides, "A plea of guilty
. . • may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of the court." Further the denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea will be reversed only when it clearly
appears the trial court has abused its discretion. State v.
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Because
defendant entered his plea prior to State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), we apply the test set forth in Warner v.
Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d
310 (Utah 1985). See Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 93. According
to that test, we examine whether the record as a whole
establishes that defendant entered his plea with full knowledge
and understanding of its consequences. Id.
Defendant contends, and the record reflects, that when he
entered his plea in court on the record, he understood he was
pleading guilty, pursuant to Alford, to arson. Defendant also
stated that there had not been any promises made to him other
than that stated in court, and that he was freely and
voluntarily entering the plea of guilty under Alford.
Defendant stated that he understood by entering the plea he was
waiving his constitutional rights, which the court had
explained to him. Defendant then entered his plea of guilty
pursuant to Alford. After the plea was entered on the record,
defendant signed an affidavit stating that on about August 21,
1984, within Salt Lake County, defendant intentionally damaged
the building of another, by fire or explosives, and the damage
exceeded $5,000. The affidavit states that defendant
understands he is pleading guilty, pursuant to Alford, to a
third degree felony and that the punishment may be zero to five
years in prison, a $5,000. fine, or both. The affidavit also
states the guilty plea is freely and voluntarily made. Thus,
despite the court's initial reference to attempted aggravated
arson and the judgment's reference to attempted aggravated
arson, considering the record as a whole, it appears defendant
entered a guilty plea to arson with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences. Therefore, we affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea and order the judgment amended to reflect
defendant's guilty plea to arson rather than attempted
aggravated arson. Because the sentence for both crimes is
identical, no correction of sentence is required.

All other issues raised on appeal have been considered and
are deemed to be without merit.
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Prayer
Petitoner, Darrel E. Brady
respectfully requests that
Writ of Certiorarri issue
to review the judgement
and opinions of the Utah
Court of Appeals,State of
Utah, this review to be
under Anders v California
386 U.S. 738, 87
S. Ct. 1396 (1976)

Opinions Below
(1) The Third District Courts Ord^r
on Defendants / Appellants
Motion for withdrawl of
Guilty Plea (Case No. CR84-1104) was issued on
March 18 Jth, 1988 (Appendix C^
(2) The opinion of the Utah Court
of Appeals (Appendix A) was
issued on February 1rst 1990.
(3) The opinion of the Utah Court
of Appeals denying appellants
Motion for Rehearing was
issued on February 14jth_, 1990

6.

Jurisdiction

The judgement of the Utah Court of Appeals
for / was entered on February 14th 1990
(Motion for Rehearing)
This petition for Certiorari^
is within ninety days of thq t
date.

Constitutional Provisions Involved

(A) United States Constitutional Ammendment
XTT
The Fourteenth Ammendment to
the Constituion provides in
pertinent port as follows:
.... nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty,or]
property without due process
of law.

8.

Statement of the Case

Petitioner Darrel E. Brady plead quilty to a simple arson
in a Utah State Prision fire, he plead guilty to an Olford
plea on April 23, 1985
On August 21st 1984 petitioner attempted

tc| excape from

the Utah State Prision and while he was going out the front
door, a fire started in the industries area of the prision
which was (3) three control centers across the prisions front
door.
Petitoner was appointed counsel and counsel states
(assistant county attorney) in January of 1985 had a plea
negotiation Petitioners had told his counsel that he would
plead to anything related to the attempted excape but he
knew nothing about the fire.

The January 1985 plea

negotiation between counsel was done without
knowledge.

petitioners

Petitioners, when advised of the negotiation,

made his position on any related plea

arrangements,clear,

ther was not to be any and consequently

sought pro se status

to stop any further negotiations, stand by counsel was
appointed.

9.

Petitioner, on April 22nd, 1985, one day before trial
at a pre-trial conference, petitioner was told by the trial
court that he should consider the plea bargin that had been
offered in January1985, some ninety days previously. Petitioner
replied "I AM READY FOR TRIALV
In effect, the very next morning on the eve of the trial
petitoner while in the holding area, got dressed in his suit
and was prepared for trial, with all witnesses subpointed.
Noone ever approached petitioner for any plea negotiations
that morning. At that time Judge Banks sent the baliff for
petitoners and his stand by attorney, to be brought to
chambers, present
attorney.At

ther was the court and the assistant

county

this time the court initated "all" conversation

and plea negotiansincluding

telling petitioners that if he

didnt take the plea bargin, that he would never get out because of the habitiual criminal count.
Petitioner refused and told the court, I cant admit
to the arson because I didnt know anything about it but
would plead to any excape charge.
The Court, the Assistant County Attorney, and the
petitioners strenously encouraged petitioner to plead guilty.
Then the court said petitioner could plead to an Alford
plea and explained that the plea to petitioner. All this

10.

overcame petitioners obvious reluctance to plead guilty.
Petitioners was misled by the court concerning appeal,
(see guilty plea transcript, Appendix "E" ) , in that petitioner, if found guilty by a jury (page #8- trans. Appendix"!!")
(L-20-25) would have no rights to appeal and would have no
rights to challange the constitutional1ity, both Utah State
and United States constitution
Petitioner repeatedly requested

(see Appendix D 3(e))

to be furnished all transcripts of case, including the
coercive attempt by the court on April 22nd 1985 to get
petitioner to plea bargin.

At the pre-trial

conference

petitioner specifically rufused any attempts to plea bargin.
Petitioner still has not recieved the April 22nd 1985 transcript .
As portrayed in the Appendix E

transcript at page #8

lines 20-25 petitioner, while in chambers was misled concerning what would be his legal status, should he go to trial.
Also involved was the threat that "if convicted petitioner would never get out" This allegation by petitioner
was never refuted. Mr.Iwasaki

(stand by counsel)I said,

he could not remember very much about the off th record, in
chambers pre-trial conference. In White v Maryland 396 U.S.
1963 the United States Supreme Court held absence of relevant
evidence and transcripts materials to the defense "the silent
record shall speak for the defendant. See alsoState v Punch

709 F. 2d 889, 891-95 (1983) (maintained innocence and only
observed the version of indictment read to him)
Petitioner maintains that everything that occured after
the in chambers coercion was illegal as petitioners ability
to comprehend was gone.

12.

BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH 84020

Reasons for Granting the Writ
Petitioner was coerced by the court. The trial court had no legal
right to bring up the plea bargin, as ther was no previous plea negotians
of any kind since petitioner went pro se some ninety days before and
the court, less than 24 hours before had tried to coerce petitioner
and was told "TTo plea bargin, In ready for trial."
A. Petitioners plea was involentary and therefore in violation
of due process of law, due the courts intervention at a time when
no plea bargin negotians were in process.

There were no ongoing

plea negotians.
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PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of his
motion to withdraw a guilty plea to attempted Aggravated arson,
claiming the trial court improperly participated in the plea
bargain agreement and his plea was not entered into voluntarily
or knowingly. We affirm.
In 1981, defendant was convicted of several crimes and
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. On August 21, 1984,
while serving that sentence, a fire was started at the prison
and shortly thereafter, defendant escaped. Defendant was
apprehended outside the prison and charged witn escape.
Several weeks later, he was charged with aggravated arson and
with being a habitual criminal.
In January 1985, defendant's attorney informed defendant
by letter of a proposed plea bargain in which defendant would
plead to a third degree felony in exchange for dismissal of the
escape and habitual criminal charges. After receiving the
attorney's letter, defendant informed the attorney he wished to
proceed pro se.
On the morning of trial, the county atto ney, defendant,
his attorney, and the judge held a pre-trial m6e ting in
chambers and discussed entering a plea. Although the record
does not contain a transcript of the in-chambe s discussion,
the State and defendant agree that during the iscussion,
defendant was informed he could enter an Alfor plea to a third
degree felony in exchange for dismissal of the escape and

habitual criminal charges.1 Immediately aftei: the meeting
defendant, the prosecutor, his attorney and the judge entered
the courtroom and discussed the plea arrangement. The court
indicated that based upon the in-chambers discussion, defendant
wanted to withdraw his plea of not guilty to aggravated arson
and enter an Alford plea to attempted aggravated arson. The
court then discussed some of the rights defendant was waiving,
obtained defendant's statement that the plea was free and
voluntary and had defendant execute an affidavit. After that
discussion, defendant's attorney stated that the plea defendant
was entering was to simple arson. The court ^hen stated
And to the charge under the amendecfl
information of aggravated arson, your
former plea of not guilty is set aside,
and to the charge of arson, a third degree
felony as I've explained to you, which
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on or about August 21, 1984 in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that the defendant, Darrell Eugene
Brady, a party to the offense, did
unlawfully and intentionally damage the
structure of a building and said value of
said destruction exceeded $5,000 by the
means of fire or explosives, what fiow is
your plea, guilty or not guilty.
Defendant responded that his plea was guilty, pursuant to
Alford. The affidavit defendant signed indicated that he was
pleading guilty to the charge of arson, a third degree felony,
pursuant to Alford. The judgment, however, states that
defendant entered a plea of guilty to attempted aggravated
arson.
Two years later, defendant filed a motion to withdraw the
guilty plea. The court denied the motion, stating:
1^ In North Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25 ^1970), the United
States Supreme Court held that "[a]n individual accused of a
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling to
or unable to admit his participation in the aqts constituting
the crime."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) provides, A plea of guilty
. . • may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of the court." Further the denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea will be reversed only when it clearly
appears the trial court has abused its discretlion. State v.
Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Because
defendant entered his plea prior to State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), we apply the test set forth in WarneE vt
709 P.2d
Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v
310 (Utah 1985). See Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 93. According
to that test, we examine whether the record as a whole
establishes that defendant entered his plea with full knowledge
and understanding of its consequences. Id.
Defendant contends, and the record reflect is, that when he
entered his plea in court on the record, he understood he was
Defendant also
pleading guilty, pursuant to Alford, to arson
made
to him other
stated that there had not been any promises
ly
and
than that stated in court, and that he was f ree
Alforfl.
voluntarily entering the plea of guilty under
Defendant stated that he understood by enteri rig the plea he was
waiving his constitutional rights, which the court had
explained to him. Defendant then entered his plea of guilty
pursuant to Alford. After the plea was entered on the record,
defendant signed an affidavit stating that on about August 21,
1984, within Salt Lake County, defendant intent ionally damaged
the building of another, by fire or explosives and the damage
exceeded $5,000. The affidavit states that defendant
understands he is pleading guilty, pursuant to Alford, to a
third degree felony and that the punishment
be zero to five
years in prison, a $5,000. fine, or both. The affidavit also
states the guilty plea is freely and voluntari Jly made. Thus,
despite the court's initial reference to at tempted aggravated
arson and the judgment's reference to attempted aggravated
arson, considering the record as a whole, it a bpears defendant
entered a guilty plea to arson with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences. Therefore, we affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to Withdraw his
guilty plea and order the judgment amended to reflect
defendant's guilty plea to arson rather than a ttempted
aggravated arson. Because the sentence for both crimes is
identical, no correction of sentence is required,

Defendant has failed to show good tause as
to why his plea should be set aside. The
terms of the plea negotiation were
discussed and outlined in correspondence
between the prosecutor and defense counsel
before the parties appeared in court for
entry of the plea. Judge Banks made a
finding that the plea was voluntarily made
and defendant has failed to produce
evidence to support his claim that the
plea was coerced and therefore a nullity,
or for any other reason that the p+ea
should be set aside.
This appeal followed.
Defendant asserts that the trial judge improperly
participated in the plea bargain agreement and coerced him to
enter a plea. Generally, the trial court's p4 rticipation in
plea negotiations is not to be encouraged due to the danger
that a trial court's participation might have a coercive effect
on defendant. State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utj ah 1986).
Further, Rule 11 provides that the judge shal4 not participate
in plea discussions prior to any agreement by the prosecuting
attorney and defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 5-ll(8)(a)
(1989). However, where there is no record evijdence that the
trial court participated in the agreement or that the judge's
actions coerced defendant to plead guilty, Rul e 11 is not
violated. Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301. In this cas e, the only
indication that the trial judge participated i|n plea
negotiations is defendant's recollection that the court
explained to him that he could enter his plea pursuant to
Alford and thereby not admit the acts supporti ng the charge.
We therefore find that the record does not support the
contention that the judge improperly participa ted in the plea
negotiations.
Defendant also contends he was improperly convicted of
attempted aggravated arson because the in-chambers discussion
led him to believe he was going to enter an Alford plea to
simple arson. In the transcript, the judge re]fers to both a
plea of attempted aggravated arson and a plea of arson. Thus,
defendant claims, he was confused when he pled guilty. The
State concedes that the record from the taking of the guilty
plea is confusing and agrees that the plea ant icipated and
entered was to arson. Accordingly, the State requests that the
sentence be corrected to reflect defendant's cbnviction for
arson. Further, because the statutory sentences are the same,
the State claims, no correction of sentence is required.

All other issues raised on appeal have been considered and
are deemed to be without merit.

RgjgriTal^.

Garff,

^ ^ j J L h M. B i l l i

s, Judg

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

